Book Review: India's Wars: A Military History, 1947-1971 - Arjun Subramaniam

India's Wars: A Military History, 1947-1971 - Arjun Subramaniam

A new generation of Indians are rediscovering their military history, realizing that the popular narratives often fail to reflect the complexities of the truth. Today, India's military remains resource-constrained, overstretched, and increasingly aware of the dual-front threat posed by China and Pakistan. Its strategy and preparedness are shaped by a mix of historical conflicts, and contemporary geopolitical realities. For anyone genuinely interested in understanding the historical wars with our Pakistan and China, "India's Wars: A Military History, 1947-1971" by Arjun Subramaniam is an indispensable read.  The book offers a compelling examination of India’s military evolution post-independence, with detailed accounts of pivotal wars, including the Indo-Pak Wars (1947-48, 1965, and 1971) and the Sino-Indian War of 1962. Battles into contested regions like Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (referred to as Azad Kashmir by Pakistan), Gilgit-Baltistan, Arunachal Pradesh (claimed by China as South Tibet) are meticulously explored, often accompanied by maps to provide clarity. While the historical narrative may pose a challenge for casual readers, the book is rewarding for those seeking the intricacies of battlefield strategies and political decision-making. I have few notable observations as a reader:

• The departure of the British left India with inadequately demarcated borders leading to the territorial disputes.
• India has reliance on idealism and restraint that clashed with the pragmatic, force-centric approaches of adversaries like China and Pakistan.
• Unfolding of events in China India 1962 war is tragic tale for the Indians. Tragedy presents situations in which there is a desperate urge to assign blame. In all this chain of events, failure of intelligence and political decision framework hurts most.
• India's limited intelligence-gathering capabilities and the "fog of war" resulted in critical decision-making dilemmas. These inadequacies were evident in moments of crisis, often amplifying the challenges faced during conflicts.
• India captured the strategically vital Haji Pir Pass during the 1965 war but returned it to Pakistan under the Tashkent Agreement, forfeiting a key advantage in controlling infiltration routes into Kashmir.  
• After the Bangladesh Liberation War, India released about 90,000 Pakistani prisoners of war without leveraging their return for a resolution on Kashmir or territorial securities, drawing criticism for missing a major bargaining chip.
• Post-1971 victory, India did not negotiate for the transfer of border enclaves or land on Bangladesh’s side that could have reduced the vulnerability of the Siliguri Corridor (“Chicken’s Neck”), leaving the Northeast perpetually exposed. The Siliguri Corridor remains at risk due to inadequate geopolitical leverage post-1971 and greater China-Bangladesh collaboration.

Subramaniam also highlights a hard-learned lesson for India: in international relations, realism often trumps idealism. It took nearly 25 years for Indian leadership to move beyond the non-violent and nonaligned ideals of the independence movement and adopt force as a legitimate instrument of statecraft. This shift is at the heart of India's modern military doctrine, making the book an essential resource for understanding the evolution of its strategic mindset.